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In this thesis, we attempt to detect arms companies that have been involved in UN arms 
embargo violations and study their connections to tax havens. We hypothesize that the opaque 
structure of tax havens may provide a cover of the substantial proceeds stemming from illegal 
arms trade. Our sample consists of data on 108 arms and defense companies in the time period 
2005 to 2020. We use an event study approach to investigate whether individual arms 
companies obtain abnormal returns around an unexpected event that impacts the conflict 
intensity within an embargo-affected country or region. We base the detection method on the 
assumption that insiders and well-informed investors are aware of the company’s hidden 
profitable behavior. Thus, a significant abnormal increase (decrease) in the stock price 
following the news of a hostility-increasing (hostility-decreasing) event may indicate that 
insiders change their expectations of future earnings. In other words, the insider or well-
informed investor expect a shift in arms demand, suggesting that the company is thus guilty of 
illicit arms trafficking.  
 
Out of 108 global arms companies, we detect 19 possible UN arms embargo violators in five 
out of the six analyzed embargoes. When we base a list of tax havens on the consensus of three 
organizations (OECD, Tax Justice Network and IMF), that only includes small states and 
islands, we do not find evidence that companies with tax havens are more likely to violate arms 
embargoes. However, when extending the list to include bigger states, suggested by the tax 
haven lists of both Tax Justice Network (2007) and IMF (2008), we find that companies with 
tax haven presence are statistically significantly more likely to violate embargoes. In contrast 
to our expectations, we do not find any evidence that embargo violators with tax haven presence 











This thesis was written as part of our Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Through the process, we have 
gained valuable knowledge about the topics covered in the thesis, as well as improved skills in 
the programming language R.  
 
First and foremost, we want to express our gratitude to our supervisor, Associate Professor 
Floris Tobias Zoutman for his valuable and constructive feedback. Furthermore, we would like 
to extend our gratitude to the Norwegian Centre for Taxation (NoCeT) and The Norwegian Tax 
Administration (Skatteetaten) for the grant opportunity.  
 
The idea to study arms trades and tax havens originated from the subject Corporate Crime: 
Detection and Prevention. Consequently, we would like to thank Associate Professor Evelina 
Gavrilova-Zoutman for inspiring us to gain further insight into the topic.  
 





Bergen, December 2020 












1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6 
2. Theoretical framework ........................................................................................................ 9 
2.1 Related literature .............................................................................................................. 9 
2.2 Theoretical stock price ................................................................................................... 11 
2.3 Insider trading and asymmetric information .................................................................. 11 
2.4 Efficient Market Hypothesis .......................................................................................... 12 
2.5 Tax havens ...................................................................................................................... 13 
2.5.1 Tax haven definitions .............................................................................................. 13 
2.5.2 Harmful effects of tax haven structures .................................................................. 15 
2.6 Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................... 16 
3. Methodology........................................................................................................................ 17 
3.1 Event study framework .................................................................................................. 17 
3.1.1 Event date, event window and estimation window ..................................................... 17 
3.1.2 Market model and estimation of normal return ........................................................... 18 
3.1.3 Abnormal return calculation ........................................................................................ 19 
3.1.4 Significance testing and statistical errors .................................................................... 19 
3.2 Cross-sectional analysis ................................................................................................. 20 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 regression model................................................................................ 20 
3.2.2 Hypothesis 2 regression model................................................................................ 21 
4. Data ...................................................................................................................................... 23 
4.1 Company selection, market data and trimming .............................................................. 23 
4.2 Arms embargo selection ................................................................................................. 25 
4.3 Event selection ............................................................................................................... 26 
4.4 Tax havens and corporate structure ................................................................................ 27 
    
 
5
5. Empirical analysis .............................................................................................................. 28 
5.1 Detection of arms embargo violators ............................................................................. 28 
5.2 Embargo violators and presence in tax havens .............................................................. 30 
5.3 Tax havens and abnormal returns ................................................................................... 35 
5.4 Limitations and further research..................................................................................... 38 
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 39 
References ............................................................................................................................... 40 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 43 
 
 
List of figures 
FIGURE 1: EVENT STUDY TIMELINE ........................................................................................................ 18 
FIGURE 2: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE COMPANY SAMPLE .................................................. 24 
 
List of tables 
TABLE 1: OECD (2000), TJN (2007) & IMF (2008) TAX HAVEN LISTS ................................................. 14 
TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF SIC CODES....................................................................................................... 23 
TABLE 3: SELECTED EMBARGOES .......................................................................................................... 26 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE COMPANY SAMPLE ................................................................. 27 
TABLE 5: EXAMPLE OF INDIVIDUAL EVENT STUDY RESULTS ................................................................. 28 
TABLE 6: ILLEGAL REACTIONS AND CHAINS .......................................................................................... 29 
TABLE 7: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VIOLATORS AND NON-VIOLATORS ................................................ 31 
TABLE 8: REGRESSION RESULTS- EMBARGO VIOLATORS AND PRESENCE IN TAX HAVENS.................... 31 
TABLE 9: REGRESSION RESULTS- COMPARISON OF EMBARGOES ........................................................... 34 
TABLE 10: REGRESSION RESULTS- TAX HAVENS AND ABNORMAL RETURNS ........................................ 35 









In 2013, a Yemen-bound shipping with 8000 firearms departed from the harbor of Brazil 
(Paraguassu, 2016). Prepared to receive the cargo was the notorious arms trafficker and rebel 
commander Fares Mana’a. Three years in advance, the UN imposed sanctions on Mana’a after 
evidence of him violating the arms embargo in Somalia by providing Al-Shabaab with 
weaponry. Al-Shabaab is a Somali radical Islamist movement listed as a terrorist group by 
several nations. In May 2016, two former executives in the largest Brazilian arms company 
Forjas Tauras were prosecuted for the arms smuggling. 
 
The illicit arms trades are mainly concentrated in areas affected by political unrest, socio-
economic inequality and civil wars (Small Arms Survey, n.d.). Small Arms Survey (Karp, 
2018) have estimated that there are approximately one billion firearms in the world, of 
which 85% are in possession of civilians. The circulation and fueling of arms cause human 
suffering, corrosion of democracies, underdevelopment and foster crime and terrorism. As a 
measure to restore peace, the UN has historically imposed arms trade bans, commonly referred 
to as embargoes, on conflict-affected areas and insurgents. Nevertheless, the embargoes have 
proved to be ineffective as several violations have been recorded yet few of the culprits are 
prosecuted (Control Arms, 2006). 
 
The arms industry is associated with a high level of secrecy, partly due to the necessity of 
protecting national interests. However, the industry is frequently linked to questionable deals 
and corruption scandals, suggesting there is a need of greater transparency and integrity. 
According to a study from 2015, 2/3 of the examined defense companies had poor or non-
existent ethics and anti-corruption programs (Transparency International, 2015).  
 
The lack of prosecuted embargo violators may be a result of the violators’ ability to conceal the 
proceeds and traceability. A possible way of hiding the origin of crime earnings is through 
exploiting the secrecy benefits of tax havens.1 There is no doubt that the lack of transparency, 
regulatory and supervision in such jurisdictions lower the threshold of committing crimes. For 
instance, the UK arms company Bae Systems has previously been accused of corruption and 
 
1 When referring to tax havens, we use the terms tax haven, haven, secrecy jurisdiction and offshore financial 
centers interchangeably. 
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processing bribes through the anonymous shell company Red Diamond Trading, located in the 
tax haven British Virgin Islands (Evans & Leigh, 2003). 
 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, to detect possible UN arms embargo violators in 
the time period 2005 to 2020 through measuring arms companies’ stock price effects of events 
that impact the level of unrest within an embargo. We assume insiders and well-informed 
investors are likely to have knowledge about an arms company’s involvement in embargo 
breaches. Naturally, only insiders are aware of this, as the non-compliant behavior of the 
company is kept secret from the public to avoid reputational losses and sanctions. An event that 
reduce the hostility level within an embargo, e.g. a ceasefire, should result in lower demand for 
arms and changed investor expectations of the arms company’s future earnings. Rational 
investors thereby sell their stocks and the stock price drops following the news about the event, 
resulting in negative abnormal returns. Likewise, a hostility-increasing event should lead to 
positive abnormal returns. We use an event study methodology, based on DellaVigna and La 
Ferrara (2010), to assess the effects of the 60 selected conflict events on each company’s stock 
price, in order to pinpoint the possible embargo violators.  
 
The detection of violators lays the foundation for the analysis of the two hypotheses of the 
thesis. The company will not engage in illicit trades if they are not capable of concealing the 
smuggling activity and crime proceeds. Consequently, we proceed to analyze and discuss 
whether we find connections between the detected embargo violators and use of the secretive 
and transparency-lacking tax havens that facilitate concealment of ill-gotten gains. As a result, 
we aim to test the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: Arms companies with tax haven presence are more likely to violate arms embargoes. 
H2: Arms embargo violators with tax haven presence obtain higher abnormal returns. 
 
The sample consists of market data for 108 arms and defense companies in the above-
mentioned time period, and our findings imply that several of them have been involved in illicit 
trades. An important finding is that companies with tax haven presence are significantly more 
likely to violate embargoes when we define tax havens in accordance to the consensus of the 
Tax Justice Network (2007) and IMF (2008) haven lists. Finally, we do not find any evidence 
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that supports the hypothesis of violators with tax havens obtaining higher abnormal returns 
around conflict dates.  
 
Our thesis is motivated by the substantial secrecy aspect of the arms industry and tax havens. 
Illicit arms trade not only contributes to escalation of war and suffering, but also considerable 
economic and social costs for all countries, in terms of ripple effects such as refugee crises, 
medical aid costs and military assistance. Regarding the role of tax havens, the existing research 
implies the jurisdictions are not only used for tax avoidance, but also for illegitimate purposes 
and thereby facilitate crimes like illegal arms trade. Consequently, we aim to shed light on this 
welfare topic, and to promote increased allocation of investigation resources to this type of 
crime. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In section 2, we will present the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, i.e. we place the study in context of previous research and central 
concepts. In the last part of the section, we present and explain the two hypotheses of the thesis. 
In section 3, we provide explanations of our methodological approach. Furthermore, we present 
the data collection method and trimming procedures in section 4, while we display our empirical 
results, limitations and suggestions for future research in section 5. Finally, we present the 
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2. Theoretical framework 
In this section, we present the theoretical framework and central concepts of the thesis. Initially, 
we provide an overview of related literature. We then explain and define topics that are relevant 
for understanding the thesis, namely the theoretical stock price, insider trading and the efficient 
market hypothesis. In addition, we present the characteristics of tax havens and compare several 
definitions of these jurisdictions. Furthermore, we discuss how these traits facilitate crime. 
Lastly, we present the two hypotheses of the study and place them in the context of the 
theoretical framework and previous research. 
 
2.1 Related literature 
We aim to contribute to research within forensic economics by detecting possible violations of 
UN arms embargoes. The lack of transparency in the controversial industry results in 
difficulties with monitoring trades and detecting possible offenses. Thus, directly linked 
research on the topic is, to our knowledge, limited. However, our study is based on the proposed 
method for detecting illegal arms trade provided by DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010). Through 
their event studies, they investigate whether individual arms companies obtain significant 
abnormal returns following an event that impacts the hostility level within an embargo-affected 
country, as a result of insider trading. More specifically, a significant abnormal increase 
(decrease) in the company’s stock price occurring shortly after a sudden hostility-increasing 
(hostility-decreasing) event may indicate that the company is involved in illicit trades. The 
scholars required at least two such significant company reactions, so-called chains of illegal 
reactions, in order to be identified as a violator, and they detected a total of 23 chains in the 8 
countries investigated. 19 companies were responsible for the 23 chains, implying that some of 
the companies were involved in more than one conflict. As the researchers focused on the time 
period 1990 to 2005, we aim to prolong the research through performing the analysis on the 
time period 2005 to 2020. Nevertheless, it is essential to mention that neither the study of 
DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) nor our study provide concrete evidence of a company being 
involved in illicit arms trades. Thus, we will not name the companies identified as culprits.  
 
Our thesis is related to the strand of papers that use event studies to investigate market reactions 
connected to political events. Incerti and Incerti (2019) use the event study methodology to 
investigate the impact of regime changes on the stock index of the respective country. Their 
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findings imply that the effects of assassinations are negative abnormal returns of 2%, while the 
outcome of resignations are positive abnormal returns of 4%. The researchers suggest that the 
reason the effect of assassinations is lower (in absolute value) might be due to uncertainty in 
investor expectations. On the other hand, the higher abnormal returns following resignations 
might imply removal of poor leadership and improved future prospects. Similarly, Guidolin 
and La Ferrara (2006) explore the stock reactions of diamond mining firms following the 
sudden death of an Angolan rebel leader and the subsequent ceasefire. The researchers find 
evidence of decreased abnormal returns of 4 percentage points, indicating that the stock market 
considered the end of the conflict as negative for mining companies holding concessions in 
Angola. 
 
We also aim to contribute to literature that investigates the use of tax havens for possible 
illegitimate purposes. In light of the Panama Paper scandal,2 researchers have gained access to 
information about secret offshore vehicles (SOVs), enabling them to examine the corporate use 
of such offshore services. O’Donovan, Wagner and Zeume (2019) use an event study 
methodology to analyze the stock price changes of companies with SOVs following the 
leakage. The scholars detect significant drops in company market values, indicating that the 
companies used the secret offshore services to conceal crimes like corruption and tax evasion. 
More specifically, the negative abnormal returns were presumably a consequence of substantial 
fines and loss of future bribe-linked cash flows due to the disclosure. Hence, the researchers 
interpreted the market reaction as evidence that the jurisdictions enable illegitimate behavior, 
and they estimated a loss of USD 174 billion in market capitalization for involved companies. 
Braun and Weichenrieder (2015) investigate the impact of a tax information exchange 
agreement (TIEA) on the magnitude of German investments in tax havens. The study shows 
investments in the jurisdictions decreased by 46%, compared to a control group, following the 
signing of a TIEA between Germany and the secrecy jurisdiction. These findings indicate that 
the tax aspect of the jurisdictions is not the solely reason for presence in the haven, but also the 





2 In 2016, approximately 11.5 million documents were leaked from the Panama-based law firm, Mossack Fonseca, 
revealing how influential people and corporations used shell companies to conceal criminal activity like tax 
evasion and corruption (ICIJ, 2016). 
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2.2 Theoretical stock price 
As we base the detection strategy on stock price changes, we consider it relevant to provide the 
theoretical definition of a stock price. As stated by Gordon and Shapiro (1956), the theoretical 







P0 is the stock price at t = 0, Dt is the expected dividends at time t and k is the discount rate. 
The formula implies that variation in the stock price is a result of changes in either expected 
future cash flows or discount rate. 
 
2.3 Insider trading and asymmetric information  
To detect potential embargo violators, we rely on the occurrence of insider trading as a result 
of the insider’s knowingness of hidden profitable activity. To understand how market reactions 
around war event dates can indicate involvement in illicit trades, it is essential to define the 
concept of insider trading. Insider trading is defined as trades of stocks or other financial 
instruments undertaken by individuals with access to private information about a public 
company (Oslo Børs, n.d.). Although the act of insider trading is often linked to fraudulent 
behavior, insider trading is permitted when certain requirements are met. In several 
jurisdictions, the trade must be reported to the respective regulatory, normally within few 
business days, to be considered a conduct of legal insider trading. 
  
Insiders like executives and directors naturally have more information on the financial and 
strategic situation of a company, as well as future outlooks and opportunities. Thus, the insider 
has an incentive to profit of the information advantage through trading of stocks. Wu (2019) 
states that the asymmetric information is a substantial determinant of the insider’s abnormal 
returns. Information asymmetry occurs when one of the parties in a transaction or decision-
making process possess more or better information (Goolsbee, Levitt & Syverson, 2013, p. 
606). 
 
The phenomenon of insider trading has been widely researched, and studies show insider 
trading occurs even in cases involving highly confidential and sensitive information. In an event 
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study of US-backed coups, Dube, Kaplan and Naidu (2011) find evidence of precoup insider 
trading reflecting the expectations of future profit gains for exposed companies. Similarly, 
Maloney and Mulherin (2003) explore stock price movements on the day of the Challenger 
space shuttle explosion in 1986. They find evidence of the market pinpointing the shuttle 
contractor accountable of the technical error prior to the public announcement of the culprit. 
More specifically, the market responded within minutes, while the results from the investigation 
were released several months later.  
  
Based on previous research, we find it reasonable to assume that insiders and well-informed 
investors are likely to be aware of a company’s involvement in illicit arms trafficking and 
embargo breaches. These trades are naturally kept secret from the public as the company 
engages in both ethical and legal violations. The investor thereby has an incentive to profit of 
the present information asymmetry through trading of stocks following news that impact arms 
demand and accelerates or delays the lifting of an embargo. For instance, a conflict de-
escalating event like the signing of a peace agreement between rebels, should result in lower 
future arms demand and correspondingly lower profits for the company. Hence, rational 
investors, with possession of this information, should sell their stocks following the event to 
avoid financial losses.  
 
2.4 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
To better understand our approach of analyzing stock market reactions in the days surrounding 
the conflict event, we will briefly present the fundamental theory of market efficiency. The 
main idea of the theory is that financial markets are considered efficient if the security prices 
reflect all available information (Fama, 1970). Fama (1970) states that stock prices follow a 
random walk, i.e. any changes in the price are random and unpredictable, and the stock price 
will rapidly adjust to reflect any new information that implies the stock is underpriced or 
overpriced. Furthermore, the hypothesis also states that stock market investors are rational and 
that their investments are based upon rational behavior. By interpreting the stock price changes 
around the conflict date, we assume markets are informationally efficient and that the 
investment strategy of the investors reflects their rational expectations of the arms company’s 
future earnings. 
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2.5 Tax havens 
Thus far, our main focus has been investor exploitation of knowledge about the arms company’s 
participation in illegal activity. In the following, we will direct the focus to how corporate use 
of tax havens can facilitate the company’s decision of engaging in embargo breaches. One can 
argue that the structure and nature of such jurisdictions may provide a cover of the substantial 
proceeds stemming from illicit arms trafficking. A short description of tax haven characteristics 
is relevant as they are not only attractive due to the level of anonymity they provide. 
Furthermore, we will provide a list of tax havens in accordance to three different organizations, 
and we explain why having tax haven presence lowers the cost of law-breaking behavior. 
 
2.5.1 Tax haven definitions 
Although an accurate universal definition of a tax haven, also called secrecy jurisdiction, is 
lacking, there are several sources and organizations that have compiled lists of tax havens. 
However, the absence of a clear definition has resulted in significant differences in the lists. 
Nevertheless, the term is used to describe any country or geographical area that allows any 
foreign individuals or companies minimal or nil tax liabilities (European Parliament, 2018). 
The structure is commonly combined with high level of secrecy and lack of effective 
information exchange with other jurisdictions. In a report by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1998), the organization highlights four key 
characteristics of tax havens: minimal or no taxation, ring-fencing legislation, lack of 
transparency and no requirement of considerable activity in the jurisdiction. In the following, 
we will briefly address these tax haven traits.  
  
The regime offers substantial incentives for foreign capital inflow due to the low taxation. 
According to a study of multinational companies, approximately 40% of the profits in 2015, 
equivalent to more than USD 600 billion, were shifted to tax havens (Tørsløv, Wier & Zucman, 
2018, p. 3). Moreover, the favorable regulations are offered to non-residents and foreign firms, 
while residents are subject to other legislation and stricter supervisory. The havens enable 
corporations to conceal beneficial ownership, financial reports and other central corporate 
information. As a result, the country of origin is not capable of taking defense measures and 
detect possible illegal financial flows. In other words, the regime facilitates harmful behavior 
like tax evasion, corruption, embezzlement and illegal arms trade, as proven through the 
Panama Paper scandal. Lastly, OECD states the fourth characteristic is no requirement of 
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considerable activity in the jurisdiction, indicating that the solely purpose of presence is tax 
benefits and/or the secrecy factors. 
 
In 2000, OECD aimed to identify tax havens by publishing a list based on the above-mentioned 
factors. However, the organization has received criticism due to list deficiencies and doubts 
about their objectivity. Tax Justice Network (TJN), an independent research network, argues 
that e.g. the OECD member countries Switzerland and Luxembourg should have been on the 
list, according to OECD’s own criteria (Shaxson, 2016). Tax Justice Network has compiled 
several lists of tax havens. In recent times, the list has been based on a Financial Secrecy Index 
(FSI). The first published index depended on 12 secrecy indicators including factors like 
ownership registration, compliance to anti-money laundering recommendations and authority 
access to information exchange. Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a 
list in 2008 containing offshore financial centers, which is often used as a synonym for tax 
havens in academics. The list is in accordance with their definition of an offshore financial 
center: “An OFC is a country or jurisdiction that provides financial services to nonresidents on 
a scale that is incommensurate with the size and the financing of its domestic economy” 
(Zoromé, 2007).  
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In Table 1, jurisdictions defined as tax havens according to the OECD list from 2000, the TJN 
list from 2007 and the IMF list from 2008 are specified and compared. All listed areas are 
included in the TJN list. A noteworthy element is that IMF and TJN also include states like 
Hong Kong and Ireland, not only islands and small-scale states.  
 
2.5.2 Harmful effects of tax haven structures 
Schjelderup (2015) argues that the primary goal of tax havens is to provide secrecy. Although 
companies frequently use tax havens as part of the lawful tax planning activities, the researcher 
discuss how the level of confidentiality facilitate the existence of asymmetric information. 
Consequently, the havens enable the company to misreport to its home country and not facing 
any consequences for their actions. The presence of asymmetric information not only relates to 
the lack of information exchange, but also lack of effective supervision and the hidden 
information about beneficial ownership of accounts and assets (Schjelderup, 2015). This is an 
important aspect in the context of this study, as the havens, through their lack of transparency, 
reduce the cost of committing crimes like illegal arms trade.  
 
Economic theories state that the choice of committing a crime is essentially based on the 
individual’s rational utility maximization (Becker, 1968). Simply stated, the criminal (the arms 
company in our case) compares the expected gains to the expected costs of the criminal act, in 
addition to evaluating the probability of being detected. There might be strategic, economic and 
political incentives for embargo breaches, while possible costs include compliance and 
reputational costs. Companies consider the likelihood of being detected and exposed as an 
embargo violator differently, e.g. based on the differences in effectiveness of supervision, 
regulations and/or corruption levels3 in the countries they are headquartered or operate in. 
Hence, the gains, costs and probability are evaluated differently across companies, depending 
on e.g. where they are located, their size, the smuggling route or their ability to conceal the 
proceeds. However, the decision to commit crime also relates to non-monetary aspects, like the 
corporate governance of the company. The key aspect in terms of having presence in tax havens 
is that the anonymity the havens provide results in reduced likelihood of being detected as an 
embargo violator, as the trades go under the radar. The home government of the company might 
 
3 DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) find evidence of positive abnormal returns in arms companies headquartered 
in high corrupt countries following a conflict-increasing embargo event, while the associated response in arms 
companies located in low corrupt countries is negative abnormal returns. 
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not be capable of investigating the company as the havens refuse to exchange information, or 
the illicit trades go completely undetected. International organizations, like the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2010), argue that the opaque structure creates an exit 
strategy of criminal liability, and they point specifically at arms traffickers, among others, as 
owners of shell companies. 
 
2.6 Hypotheses 
In the previous sections, we have discussed how the structure of tax havens lowers the cost of 
engaging in crimes like illegal arms trafficking. In an arms smuggling perspective, there might 
be several purposes of using secret offshore services. First, the jurisdictions allow the company 
to conceal the proceeds from illicit trades and thereby lower the probability of being exposed. 
Secondly, the secrecy regime facilitates financial flows stemming from briberies. 
Consequently, we aim to firstly test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Arms companies with tax haven presence are more likely to violate arms embargoes. 
 
Among the embargo-violating companies, companies with tax haven presence should obtain 
higher abnormal returns due to their ability to shift and hide their profits to a jurisdiction with 
both lower tax and transparency. At the same time, the secrecy aspect of the tax havens should 
reduce the probability that the violations will be detected in the future. Hence, the expected 
future cash flows should reflect the reduced likelihood of monetary and reputational costs in a 
scenario where the company is revealed as a violator. As a result, our second hypothesis is:  
 
H2: Arms embargo violators with tax haven presence obtain higher abnormal returns. 
 
In order to test the connectedness of arms embargo violators and tax havens, we initially 
conduct individual event studies to identify the possible violators. For companies that are 
involved in illicit trades, events that suddenly increase (decrease) the intensity of a conflict 
within an embargo would consequently increase (decrease) the demand for arms, both in the 
present time and in the future. The detection method consequently relies on stock price changes 
around the event date, as a result of the investors’ changed expectations of the arms company’s 
future cash flows. 




In the following section, we will describe our methodological approach to test the hypotheses 
of the thesis. First of all, we present the event study framework that enables us to detect possible 
embargo violators. Hence, we perform individual event studies for each company-event pair. 
In the final part, we explain the regression models used to draw any inferences regarding our 
hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Event study framework 
We make use of the event study methodology to measure the stock price changes of a conflict-
increasing or conflict-decreasing event on firm value in a predefined time window around the 
event date. The method is often used to measure the market response to a wide range of 
announcements such as M&As, regulatory changes or election outcomes, to mention a few. 
However, in this study we measure the individual stock price changes for each company of each 
conflict event to detect any pattern correspondent to illegal behavior. Our methodological 
approach is in line with the event study framework developed by MacKinlay (1997). 
  
3.1.1 Event date, event window and estimation window 
In our study, the events of interest are events that increase or decrease hostilities within an 
embargo. We treat the day of the incident as the event date. However, if the event occurred in 
a weekend or another non-trading day, we treat the next trading day as the event date. 
  
The effect on the stock price is measured in a predefined time window called the event window. 
We conduct this analysis with an event window consisting of three days, spanning from one 
trading day prior to the event to one trading day after the event date. Our reasoning for including 
the day prior to the event is that there is, in some cases, hard to determine the exact day of the 
event. We also include the following trading day to capture any effects on firm value that might 
arise after the closing of the stock market on the event date (MacKinlay, 1997). We find it 
reasonable to narrow the event window to three days to isolate the event and prevent any impact 
from confounding events. 
 
For this study, we use an estimation window of 60 trading days, and its starting point is 70 
trading days prior to the event date. The estimation window is required to compute the normal 
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returns of the arms company. More specifically, the normal returns should reflect the returns if 
the event did not occur. The illustration in Figure 1 presents the timeline of our event study. 
 
 
Figure 1: Event study timeline 
 
3.1.2 Market model and estimation of normal return 
As we are focusing on return data, we transform the stock prices into natural logarithm returns: 




The return at time t is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the closing price on day t and the 
closing price on the previous trading day t-1. The intuition of log transforming is to make the 
data more consistent with normality (Henderson, 1990). 
 
We estimate normal returns, i.e. the expected returns if the event had not happened, using the 
market model. Although there are several methods that can be applied, both statistical and 
economic models, MacKinlay (1997) argues that the gains of more complex models than the 
market model is limited. By selecting the market model as the estimation method, the return of 
security i at time t is defined by the following formula: 
 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit 
E[εit] = 0 Var[εit] =  σεi
2  
 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 represents the return of the market index at time t, while 𝛽𝑖 is the systematic risk of the 
security. Consequently, 𝛽𝑖 reflects the sensitivity of the security relative to the market. 
Furthermore, αi is the constant term, meaning the return that does not relate to the market. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is the disturbance term, i.e. the abnormal return, of security i at time t with expected value equal 
to zero. σεi
2  is the variance of the disturbance term and the parameter, in addition to the 
parameters αi and 𝛽𝑖, are estimated using the OLS method to compute the normal returns.  
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3.1.3 Abnormal return calculation 
We use the estimated parameters from the market model to compute the abnormal returns in 
the event window: 
ARit = Rit − (α̂i + β̂iRmt) 
 
As the formula implies, the abnormal return of the security is equal to the difference between 
the actual return and the expected return at time t. More specifically, the abnormal return is the 
disturbance term that is not explained by the predicted returns generated from the market 
model-based estimation of normal returns. In reference to subsection 3.1.1, our main interest is 
the effect on the stock price over the complete event window (t1, t2), where t1 and t2 denote the 
first and last day of the event window, respectively. As a result, we aggregate the abnormal 
returns over the 3-day event window to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each 
company-event pair, given as: 





Under the assumption that our estimation window is long enough, the variance of the abnormal 
returns is the disturbance variance, σεi
2 , from the market model (MacKinlay, 1997, p. 21). The 
variance of the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window σi
2(t1, t2) is the number of 
event days, in our case three days, multiplied by the variance of the abnormal returns: 
 
σi
2(t1, t2) = (t2 − t1 + 1)σεi
2  
 
3.1.4 Significance testing and statistical errors 
We test the null hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window for 
company i are equal to zero. A true null hypothesis suggests that the company act in a compliant 
manner in the arms trade context. Moreover, if the null hypothesis is rejected due to significant 
negative (positive) cumulative abnormal returns as a result of a hostility-increasing (hostility-
decreasing) event, this would also imply compliant behavior. The reasoning is that the event 
delays (accelerates) the embargo lifting and correspondingly delays (accelerates) possible legal 
sales. On the other hand, if the rejection of the null hypothesis is due to significant negative 
(positive) cumulative returns as a result of a conflict-decreasing (conflict-increasing) event, the 
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company may be involved in illicit trades. We derive parametric test statistics, under the 
assumption of jointly normally distributed abnormal returns (MacKinlay, 1997, p. 21), for each 







The test statistic, 𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅, is the cumulative abnormal returns CARi(t1, t2) divided by the standard 
deviation of the cumulative abnormal returns √σ2(CARi(t1, t2))  for the specific company-
event pair in the event window. The computed test statistic is compared to the respective 
significance threshold in order to determine whether we can reject the null hypothesis. In our 
study, the significance threshold is set to 5%.  
 
We acknowledge that a single significant reaction might not be sufficient to claim the company 
is involved in illicit trades, as the above-described test procedure can result in both false 
positives and false negatives. In the context of our study, this relates to either incorrectly stating 
that the arms company has been involved in embargo breaches, or incorrectly stating that the 
arms company is not an embargo violator. To identify embargo violators for the testing of our 
two main hypotheses, we consequently require two significant company reactions, consistent 
with non-compliant behavior, within the same embargo to be categorized as an illegal arms 
trader.4  
 
3.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
Having detected the possible embargo violators through the event studies, we proceed to test 
the hypotheses of the thesis by conducting a cross-sectional study. In the following, we will 
present the regression models and the variables of interest. 
 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 regression model  
The regression model for our first hypothesis is defined by the following formula:  
 
dviolator = α + β1dTax haven + β2Abroad_Percent + β3dOECD + β4Ln(size)+ 𝜀i 
 
4Similar to DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010).  
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For this model, we make use of the Linear Probability Model (LPM). Hence, our dependent 
variable, dviolator, is binary and thereby takes the value 1 if the company is identified as an illegal 
arms trader from the conducted event studies, zero otherwise. Our independent variable, dTax 
haven, is a binary variable equal to one if the company has an affiliate located in a tax haven, zero 
otherwise. Consequently, β1 will capture the difference in the probability of embargo breaches 
if the company is present in a tax haven, compared to a company with no tax haven presence. 
This coefficient will provide evidence that either supports or contradicts our first hypothesis. 
 
We choose to include Abroad_Percent, dOECD and Ln(size) as our control variables for this 
regression model. Abroad_Percent is the proportion of affiliates located abroad relative to the 
total corporate group. This variable will control for variation that is due to differences in global 
presence in the company sample. Furthermore, dOECD is a binary variable equal to one if the 
company is headquartered in an OECD country, zero otherwise. This variable will control for 
variation based on whether the company is headquartered in a developed country or not, in 
accordance to the OECD criteria. Lastly, Ln(size), is the natural logarithm of the total corporate 
group. As the firm size naturally varies across companies, we aim to narrow the range of this 
variable by taking the natural logarithm to make it less sensitive to extreme values and mitigate 
issues with heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 193).  
 
3.2.2 Hypothesis 2 regression model  
Furthermore, the regression model for our second hypothesis is defined by the following 
formula: 
CARi = α + β1dTax haven + β2dOECD + β3Ln(Size) + 𝜀i 
 
In this model, the dependent variable, CARi, is the cumulative abnormal returns calculated from 
the individual event studies. To consider that we have both positive and negative events related 
to conflict intensity, we take the absolute value of CARi in order to adjust for the type of event 
that has occurred. In resemblance with the model from our first hypothesis, dTax haven equals one 
if the company is present in a tax haven. Likewise, β1 will provide evidence that either supports 
or contradicts our second hypothesis. The control variables included in this model are dOECD 
and Ln(Size). β2 will capture the difference between abnormal returns for companies that are 
headquartered in OECD countries compared to non-OECD countries. β3 will capture the 
variation in CARi that is explained by firm size.  
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We apply the OLS method to estimate the parameters in the regression models. This method 
assumes that the error term has constant variance across individuals or observations, which is 
defined as homoscedasticity. However, MacKinlay (1997, p.33) argues that there is no reason 
to expect that the residuals are homoscedastic when performing a cross-sectional regression on 
the abnormal returns. Although heteroskedasticity does not cause OLS estimates to be biased, 
the consequence is rather that the standard test procedures are no longer valid (Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 101). Consequently, we apply the robust standard errors suggested by White (1980) to 

























4.1 Company selection, market data and trimming 
We identified the arms companies included in the analysis based on two criteria. The company 
had to either be on the list of top 100 arms-producing and military service companies or have a 
classification code related to arms manufacturing.  
 
The top 100 list is provided by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2019), 
an institute focusing on armed conflicts, disarmament and arms control. The ranking contains 
the companies with the highest revenues derived from arms sales. We retrieved the list based 
on 2018 revenues, both because it is the latest published ranking and the majority of the 
companies recur between years.  
 
By including companies with the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes described in 
Table 2, we extended the sample to include smaller companies that did not reach a place in the 
SIPRI ranking. The four digit-code represents the primary business activity of a company, and 
it was introduced by the U.S. government in the 1930s. We identified companies through a SIC 
code search on Compustat, a database containing financial and statistical information on global 
firms. We accessed the database through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
 
Table 2: Overview of SIC codes 
SIC Code Industry 
2892 Explosives 
3482 Small Arms Ammunition 
3483 Ammunition, Except for Small Arms 
3484 Small Arms 
3489 Ordnance and Accessories 
3761 Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles 
3764 Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Propulsion Units and 
Propulsion Unit Parts 
3769 Guided Missile Space Vehicle Parts and Auxiliary 
Equipment 
3795 Tanks and Tank Components 
Note. The codes and descriptions are retrieved from NAICS Association (n.d.). 
 
Furthermore, we collected the CUSIP or ISIN belonging to each company to enable the retrieval 
of security prices from January 1, 2004, to September 1, 2020, from Compustat. CUSIP and 
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ISIN are unique codes assigned to securities, and companies lacking any of these codes were 
consequently excluded from the sample. The purpose of including data from 2004 is to have 
sufficient data for our estimation window. In addition, we retrieved the respective historical 
market index of each company to operate as a benchmark to compute abnormal returns. We 
collected the index data from Yahoo! Finance and Wall Street Journal for the above-mentioned 
time period.  
 
Finally, we performed data trimming procedures to obtain the final sample. Firstly, we removed 
the daily price observations with no corresponding market index observation. Secondly, we 
excluded companies with securities defined as penny stocks in 80% of the observed time period. 
In our analysis, we define penny stocks as stocks traded at one unit or less of their local 
currency. Lastly, we excluded extreme outliers, defined as the top and bottom 1/10 000 of the 
company return observations.  
 
The application of the above-described procedures resulted in a sample consisting of 108 
companies. As illustrated in Figure 2, approximately half of the companies are headquartered 
in North America with the majority located in the US. The tables in subsection A.1 and A.2 in 
the appendix provide more detailed company information and their respective market indices. 
 
 
Figure 2: Geographical distribution of the company sample 
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4.2 Arms embargo selection 
SIPRI provides a historical list of the countries, geographical areas and groups that have been 
under an arms embargo imposed by the UN, EU or other countries/organizations. As the 
company sample consists of global companies with headquarters on different continents, the 
selected arms embargoes had to be enforced by the UN. Thus, the embargo applies to all 
companies in the study. The embargoes had to be in force at some point in the time period 2005 
to 2020.  
 
To ensure a more clear-cut selection of embargoes, we gathered information about events 
within each embargo from ACLED,5 a non-governmental organization collecting data on 
conflicts worldwide. The data includes reports on incidents such as armed clashes, protests, 
explosions and peace agreements. Furthermore, we developed restrictions in order to focus on 
a smaller selection of embargoes. First, we excluded embargoes with less than 1000 reported 
incidents.6 Most of the embargoes had far more than 1000 events, resulting in this value as our 
choice of cut-off. Secondly, for all embargoes, we extracted the events with at least one fatality 
and obtained the 99th percentile as a measure for the most violent events. The final sample 
consists of embargoes with at least ten events within this percentile.7 Through the process 
above, our aim was to ensure that we had a sufficient number of incidents and high conflict 
intensity. Finally, there should not have been an extensive intervention from the US or UN to 
decrease the possibility of false positives as a result of legal sales to these actors.8 The latter 
restriction is based on the methodology of DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010).  
 
The above-described restrictions resulted in 6 embargoes. Table 3 presents the embargoes, 







5 ACLED [Dataset]. Publicly available at https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/ 
6 Countries excluded as a result of the first criteria are Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, North Korea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone 
and Liberia. 
7 Countries excluded as a result of the second criteria are Iran, Lebanon and South Sudan. 
8 Country excluded as a result of the third criteria is Iraq. We avoid events in the year of 2011 in Libya due to 
extensive UN intervention. 
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Table 3: Selected embargoes 
Country/Area Target Effective date 
Central African Republic Non-governmental forces December 5, 2013 
Democratic Republic of Congo Non-governmental forces July 28, 2003 
Libya Non-governmental forces February 26, 2011 
Somalia Entire country January 23, 1992 
Sudan (Darfur region) Entire region July 30, 2004 
Yemen Non-governmental forces April 14, 2015 
Note. The country/area under embargo, target and effective date are retrieved from SIPRI (n.d.). 
 
4.3 Event selection 
In this thesis, we focus on both positive and negative incidents related to domestic tensions in 
each country. The event should have either increased or decreased the conflict intensity to the 
extent that it may have affected the demand for arms. We used the event data from ACLED to 
select the events of interest within each embargo. As the reports lacked adequate events related 
to peacekeeping and information about the importance of incidents, we supplemented the 
retrieval with qualitative reading on the conflicts in the six countries and regions.  
 
Initially, we identified rebel groups that have been heavily involved in the conflicts through the 
ACLED data. As the purpose is to find multiple significant company reactions corresponding 
with illegal behavior, we believe our analysis is strengthened by mainly focusing on events 
involving the same actors within the same embargo. Furthermore, our aim was to avoid any 
events involving or directly impacting US or UN forces to eliminate the influence on arms 
demand stemming from legal sales, in resemblance with the embargo selection. We based the 
decision on whether the event increased or reduced conflict intensity on a qualitative assessment 
of conflict history. For example, September 28, 2015, hundreds of inmates were freed in an 
Anti-Balaka-initiated prison break in Central African Republic. The country is marked by 
religious strife, namely between the Christian Anti-Balaka militia and the Muslim Séléka 
militia. Hence, we consider it reasonable to assume the event intensified the conflict. Contrarily, 
the Central African government reached a peace agreement with 14 armed groups on February 
2, 2019, suggesting a de-escalation of the civil war and lower future arms demand. 
 
To ensure the events may have attracted the attention of investors and insiders, we required all 
events to have attained sufficient media coverage. More precisely, we required that the event 
must have been covered by at least one internationally recognized news provider. The media 
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had to be in the top 50 of “Top Websites Ranking” for worldwide news and media, measured 
by website traffic (SimilarWeb, 2020). More detailed information about the 60 events and their 
impact on conflict intensity is described in subsection A.3 in the appendix. 
 
4.4 Tax havens and corporate structure 
We retrieved company structure information for the entire company sample from Orbis 
Database, provided by Bureau van Dijk. The retrieved data contains information about 
corporate structure and affiliate locations for each company, and the data is based on the 
company information as of 2019 or 2020, i.e. the most recent updated data. We retrieved the 
latest available information for companies that are inactive. 
 
Due to the lack of consensus regarding which jurisdictions that are considered to be tax havens, 
we introduce two lists we choose to refer to as “black list” and “grey list”. The black list 
contains jurisdictions that recur in all of the tax haven lists by OECD (2000), Tax Justice 
Network (2007) and IMF (2008). In other words, the black list contains the jurisdictions within 
the black bracket in Table 1 from subsection 2.5.1. Furthermore, the grey list is based on 
jurisdictions that recur in both the IMF and Tax Justice Network lists, i.e. the jurisdictions 
within the grey bracket. 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of the company sample 
 Company sample  
 Mean Standard deviation 
Tax haven  
Black list 0.35 0.48 
Grey list  0.58 0.50 
OECD 0.87 0.34 
Size 222.86 365.22 
Abroad percent 0.36 0.31 
 
As we can observe from Table 4, 35% of the companies have presence in tax havens when it is 
defined by the black list, while the proportion is equal to 58% when defining tax haven in 
accordance with the grey list.  Furthermore, 87% of the companies are headquartered in an 
OECD9 country and the average corporate group in our sample consists of 223 companies. 
Lastly, the average company has a global presence equal to 36% relative to their total corporate 
group.  
 
9 OECD memberships based on 2020 list (OECD, n.d.). 
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5. Empirical analysis 
In the following section, we present the findings from the empirical analysis. Initially, we will 
examine the results from the individual event studies and detect possible UN arms embargo 
violators. In the second and third subsections, we discuss and provide the tax haven regression 
results. Lastly, we acknowledge the limitations of the study and evaluate their impact on the 
results. 
 
5.1 Detection of arms embargo violators 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) should reflect the insiders’ changed views on future 
cash flows as a result of the positive or negative shift in demand for arms. For companies that 
are not involved, CAR should either be unaffected or have the opposite effect. For instance, 
events that lead to a reduced probability of the embargo being lifted would have a negative 
effect on CAR, due to their reduced chances of trading arms legally in the foreseeable future. 
Considering that we have a great variety of events in our study, the sign of CAR will naturally 
change depending on whether the company is compliant or not. Therefore, the definition of a 
violation-implying reaction, hereby referred to as an illegal reaction, is if CAR is significantly 
different from zero and has a positive (negative) sign on an intensity-increasing (decreasing) 
event. As previously mentioned, we require at least two illegal company reactions within the 
same embargo-affected country to be considered as an embargo violator.  
 
Table 5: Example of individual event study results 
Central African Republic Company 1 Company 2 
Event ID 
(1) 












1 12/05/2013 ↑ (+) 0.27 (+) 0.1128 (-) 0.12 (-) 0.0599 
2 01/31/2014 ↑ (-) 0.31 (-) 0.1348 (-) 2.07 (-) 1.0229 
3 04/09/2014 ↑ (+) 5.81 (+) 2.9817 (-) 0.57 (-) 0.2821 
4 05/28/2014 ↑ (+) 0.30 (+) 0.1610 (-) 0.07 (-) 0.0356 
5 06/24/2014 ↑ (-) 0.86 (-) 0.4734 (+) 3.82 (+) 2.0738 
6 09/28/2015 ↑ (+) 5.65  (+) 2.5351 (-) 4.58 (-) 1.5811 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
10 02/02/2019 ↓ (-) 2.75  (-) 0.8929 (+) 2.72 (+) 1.0359 
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Table 5 presents an example of how the detection of violators is conducted for two of the 
companies in the embargo-affected country Central African Republic. Column (1) and (2) 
represent the unique ID and date of the event. In this example, we only present seven out of ten 
events in the country. Furthermore, column (3) shows the impact the event had on the conflict 
intensity within the country, whereby upward (downward) arrow symbolizes increasing 
(decreasing) level of conflict intensity. For each of the companies, the cumulative abnormal 
return is displayed in column (4) and (6), while the associated t-statistics are stated in column 
(5) and (7). Illegal reactions are marked with bold text.  
 
As we can observe from the table, Company 1 has two illegal reactions within the embargo and 
is consequently defined as a violator.  The events occurred on April 9, 2014, and September 28, 
2015, and both events contributed to increased conflict intensity. The cumulative abnormal 
returns for the company are 5.73% on average for the two events. Contrarily, Company 2 has 
only one illegal reaction within the embargo. Thus, based on the set requirements from the 
methodology, we do not categorize this company as a violator.  
 
The cumulative abnormal returns for Company 1 appear to be more consistent with the behavior 
of an embargo-violating company. For example, on event 10, the company has a negative return 
on a conflict-decreasing event, though it is not significant. Contrarily to Company 1, the returns 
are inconsistent for Company 2. For instance, on event 2 and 10, the cumulative abnormal 
returns are more in line with the behavior of a law-abiding company, even though these are as 
well not significant. This illustrates the concerns regarding false positives in our analysis and 
why we require a chain of illegal reactions within the embargo to define the company as a 
violator. The following table presents the number of illegal reactions and chains from the 
conducted event studies. 
 
Table 6: Illegal reactions and chains 
Embargo Company-event pairs Illegal reactions Illegal chains  
Central African Republic  765 26 4 
Libya 734 33 4 
Yemen 798 20 0 
Democratic Republic of Congo 809 28 6 
Somalia 798 24 3 
Sudan (Darfur region) 706 23 2 
Total 4764 154 19 
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We analyzed a total of 4764 company-event pairs, and 154 of them were classified as illegal 
reactions. Further on, these reactions led to identification of 19 different illegal chains for 19 
different companies. As a result, 19 out of 108 companies were categorized as violators. Out of 
the 19 illegal chains, one of them consisted of four illegal reactions, while the rest consisted of 
two. We identified illegal chain reactions in five out of the six analyzed embargoes. Of the 
countries with chains, the Democratic Republic of Congo has the highest number with its six 
detected chains, while Sudan has the lowest number with its two chains. The only nation we 
did not detect any chains in was Yemen. When comparing our findings to those of DellaVigna 
and La Ferrara (2010), we find only one company that was detected as a violator in both 
studies.10  
 
To summarize our findings, our results indicate several violations of UN arms embargoes in 
the time period 2005 to 2020. However, due to the risk of false positives and false negatives, 
the event studies may have either failed to detect or classified too many as culprits. Although 
the evidences are not concrete and sufficient to prove an act of arms embargo violation, it brings 
forth companies and embargoes that are worth investigating closer. As a result, the thesis 
contributes to strengthen the use of event study methodology as an investigation tool in an 
industry known to be complex and difficult to monitor.  
 
5.2 Embargo violators and presence in tax havens  
Having detected the violators in the first part of the empirical analysis, we aim to compare 
violators with non-violators in terms of exploitation of tax havens. More specifically, we 
believe having presence in tax havens will simplify the process of concealing proceeds from 
illicit trades. As a result, this subsection seeks to test the following hypothesis:  
  
H1: Arms companies with tax haven presence are more likely to violate arms embargoes. 
 





10 Note, however, that DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) investigated different embargoes in a different time 
period, namely Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Yugoslavia in 1990-2005. 
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Table 7: Summary statistics of violators and non-violators 
 Violators Non-violators 
 Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Tax haven     
Black list 0.37 0.50 0.35 0.48 
Grey list  0.79 0.42 0.54 0.50 
OECD 0.84 0.37 0.88 0.33 
Size 229.11 205.65 221.53 391.82 
Abroad percent 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.31 
Company total 19 89 
 
As we can observe from the table, the proportion of companies with tax haven presence is 
greater for violators than non-violators regardless of the tax haven lists. However, the difference 
is more significant when we define havens by the grey list. Among the companies, 84% of the 
violators are headquartered in an OECD country versus 88% for non-violators. The average 
company identified as a violator has a bigger corporate group, but it has a lower global presence 
compared to the non-violators. To draw any inferences regarding our hypothesis, we apply the 
regression model as defined in subsection 3.2.1.  
  




























 dTax haven  0.013 -0.070 0.149** 0.274** 
 (0.078) (0.110) (0.069) (0.106) 
     
Abroad_Percent   -0.127  -0.164 
  (0.136)  (0.133) 
     
 dOECD  -0.071  -0.092 
  (0.120)  (0.112) 
     
Ln(Size)  0.041*  -0.015 
  (0.022)  (0.023) 
     
     
Constant 0.171*** 0.148 0.089** 0.211* 
 (0.045) (0.126) (0.043) (0.121) 
     
Observations 108 108 108 108 
The values in parentheses are the robust standard errors. Statistical significance is denoted 
with *, ** and ***, representing 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 8 is divided into two parts and presents our results from running the regression. In the 
two initial columns, the dummy for tax haven presence is defined by the black list described in 
section 4.4. Thus, if the company has presence in at least one jurisdiction that recur on all of 
the tax havens lists by OECD (2000), Tax Justice Network (2007) and IMF (2008), dTax haven 
equals one. In the two final columns, the dummy equals one if the company is present in any 
of the jurisdictions defined as tax havens by both Tax Justice Network (2007) and IMF (2008). 
The main purpose of introducing these two different interpretations of tax havens is to examine 
whether our results are consistent between the definitions.  
  
In column (1), we only include the dummy for presence in tax haven. The coefficient is, as 
expected, positive. However, it is not significant, and the interpretation is that companies with 
tax haven presence, according to the black list, are only 1.3% more likely to violate embargoes 
than those without. When we in column (2) include our control variables, we observe that this 
coefficient remains non-significant and decreases to -7%. This indicates that, in our sample, 
companies with presence in any of these jurisdictions are less likely to violate embargoes. 
Consequently, our hypothesis is not supported. The interpretation of the Abroad_Percent is that 
the likelihood of embargo violation decreases marginally when the global presence increases. 
More specifically, a one percentage point increase in global presence leads to a 0.127% decrease 
in the likelihood of violation. Furthermore, companies that are headquartered in OECD 
countries are 7.1% less likely to violate embargoes than companies that are not, all else equal. 
However, the coefficients for the two latter variables are non-significant. For our last variable, 
a relative increase in the size of the company leads to a statistically significant increase in the 
likelihood of violation, at a 10% level. 
  
For columns (3) and (4), we extend the list of jurisdictions to include the ones that OECD did 
not define as tax havens (grey list). In column (3), we observe that companies with presence in 
any of these jurisdictions are 14.9% more likely to violate embargoes. The difference in 
likelihood increases to 27.4% when we include all variables in column (4) and the coefficient 
is significant at a 5% level for both columns. This is in line with our expectations and we can 
consequently say that our hypothesis is supported, given that we define tax havens according 
to the grey list. Moreover, an increase in the global presence has a negative impact on the 
likelihood of violation. This also applies for companies that are located in OECD countries, and 
both of these results are in line with our findings from the previous paragraph, although still 
non-significant. Lastly, we observe that a relative increase in firm size has a slightly negative 
    
 
33
effect on the likelihood of violation, and the coefficient is no longer significant. However, this 
is in contrast with our findings from column (2), both regarding firm size and tax haven 
presence. A possible explanation for this is that there are one or more relatively large companies 
that we have identified as violators that are present in a tax haven according to the grey list, but 
not according to the black list. 
  
Our results appear to be inconsistent between the different definitions of tax havens. The overall 
probability is both higher and statistically significant when we define tax havens according to 
Tax Justice Network (2007) and IMF (2008) in the last two columns. This result is somewhat 
unexpected as the black list includes only the jurisdictions that all the organizations have agreed 
upon. One might assume that the jurisdictions included in the black list are more used for 
illegitimate purposes, but this might not be the case. As a result, this emphasizes the lack of 
consensus between the different lists of tax havens. A more consistent observation is that 
companies with headquarters in OECD countries have, on average, a negative impact on the 
probability of embargo violation. One can argue that these companies have a higher threshold 
of committing crimes compared to non-OECD companies due to higher associated costs (e.g. 
reputational) and they thereby contribute to a lower proportion of the violators. 
 
In order to test whether our results are robust, we extend our analysis by examining each 
embargo in isolation. Given our findings in Table 8, we will only define tax havens according 
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Table 9: Regression results- comparison of embargoes 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 dTax haven  0.049 0.064 0.043 0.054 0.064 
 (0.035) (0.047) (0.064) (0.045) (0.064) 
      
Abroad_Percent  -0.111* -0.068 -0.002 0.069 -0.053 
 (0.066) (0.106) (0.052) (0.056) (0.041) 
      
 dOECD -0.022 -0.042 0.038 0.009 -0.075 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.026) (0.011) (0.072) 
      
Ln(Size) -0.006 0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.0004 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
      
Constant 0.091 0.056 0.004 -0.006 0.067 
 (0.084) (0.077) (0.011) (0.013) (0.072) 
      
Observations  108 108 108 108 108 
The values in parentheses are the robust standard errors. Statistical significance is denoted with *, ** and 
***, representing 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
In Table 9, each column represents the unique embargo. Our dependent variable is equal to one 
if the company has been identified as a violator within the embargo, zero otherwise. Naturally, 
Yemen is not included as we did not detect any chains of reactions in this country. As we can 
observe from the table, companies with tax haven presence are on average more likely to violate 
embargoes. The results are consistent between the different embargoes, but the coefficients are 
not significant. However, this could indicate that a tax haven presence matter regardless of the 
conflict. Among the different embargoes, tax haven presence has the highest effect on embargo 
violation in Libya and Somalia with an increased likelihood of 6.4%. Contrarily, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo has the lowest with a likelihood of 4.3%. Lastly, we observe 
that our control variables appear to be consistent across the different embargoes, except for 
some insignificant deviations.  
 
Based on our findings from Table 8 and Table 9, there is sufficient evidence to assume that 
companies with tax haven presence are on average more likely to violate embargoes, given that 
we define tax havens according to the grey list. Consequently, the results imply that our 
hypothesis is supported.  
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5.3 Tax havens and abnormal returns   
In the following subsection, we will isolate the companies detected as violators and examine 
the illegal reactions that were used to identify the company as an embargo violator. By doing 
this, we aim to analyze whether companies with offshore affiliates in tax havens obtain higher 
abnormal returns around conflict events. Hence, we test the following hypothesis:   
  
H2: Arms embargo violators with tax haven presence obtain higher abnormal returns. 
 
In resemblance with subsection 5.2, we adjust the dummy for tax haven based on the two lists 
of tax havens. In addition, we will not differentiate between the embargoes due to the limited 
sample size. 
 
 Table 10: Regression results- tax havens and abnormal returns 
 Dependent variable: 
  CAR [-1,1]  
 (1)  (2)  
 dTax haven  0.012 -0.034 
 (0.008) (0.025) 
   
dOECD -0.039*** -0.042*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
   
Ln(Size) -0.008*** 0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
   
Constant 0.128*** 0.127*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
Observations 40 40 
R2  0.629 0.636 
The values in parentheses are the robust standard errors. Statistical significance is denoted 
with *, ** and ***, representing 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Table 10 presents the results from running the regression. Tax havens are defined by the black 
list and grey list in column (1) and column (2), respectively. For column (1), we see that 
companies with tax haven presence obtain 1.2 percentage points higher abnormal returns than 
those without. Contrarily, when we define tax havens according to the grey list, they obtain 3.4 
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percentage points less. Given these mixed and non-significant results, the hypothesis is not 
supported.  
 
Moreover, we find that being headquartered in an OECD country has a significant negative 
impact on CAR for both columns. More precisely, they obtain approximately 4 percentage 
points lower abnormal returns compared to non-OECD companies. These results are as 
expected because these companies may face both higher fines, reputational damage and other 
costs if they are revealed as an illicit arms trader. Given that investors are rational, the future 
expected cash flows should be adjusted according to these potential costs.   
  
Furthermore, we find that a relative increase in firm size has a statistically significant negative 
impact on CAR for column (1). This could be explained by the fact that the gains from 
participating in an illicit trade would be higher, relative to the ordinary income, for smaller 
companies. Another explanation might be that larger arms companies tend to have more 
diversified product portfolios, and an arms contract would contribute to a smaller share of 
revenues. However, this effect is approximately non-existent in column (2). As mentioned in 
subsection 5.2, there might be one or more large companies identified as violators that are only 
present in tax havens when it is defined according to the grey list, but not according to the black 
list. From the summary statistics in subsection 5.2, we know that 79% of the identified violators 
have presence in a tax haven according to the grey list. Hence, the sample size might be too 
small to draw any statistical conclusion regarding the impact of tax havens. 
 
To examine if the results are consistent, we introduce robustness tests by changing the 
dependent variable to different measures of returns. These are the cumulative abnormal returns 
for the event day and the trading day after the event (CAR [0,1]), the abnormal return on the 
event day (AR) and the raw returns on the event day (Returns). The results are shown in Table 
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Table 11: Regression results- tax havens and abnormal returns, robustness 
 Dependent variable: 
 CAR [0,1]  AR  Returns  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 dTax haven  0.011 -0.036 0.005 -0.028* 0.005 -0.030* 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.017) 
       
dOECD -0.037*** -0.040*** -0.031** -0.034** -0.035*** -0.038*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
       
Ln (Size) -0.009*** -0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
       
Constant 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2  0.567 0.576 0.449 0.474 0.480 0.505 
The values in parentheses are the robust standard errors. Statistical significance is denoted with *, ** and 
***, representing 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
In Table 11, tax havens are defined according to the black list and grey list for columns with 
odd and even numbers, respectively. In resemblance with our findings in Table 10, we observe 
that companies with tax haven presence defined by the black list obtain higher abnormal returns, 
although still non-significant. Contrarily, this effect is negative when we define tax havens 
according to the grey list and the results are consistent between the different measures of 
returns. However, we observe that the effect is significantly negative in column (4) and (6). 
  
Moreover, like our findings from Table 10, we find that companies with headquarters in OECD 
countries obtain significantly negative abnormal returns compared to non-OECD countries. 
This effect is statistically significant for all columns at the 1% significance level, except 
columns (3) and (4) where it is 5%. Likewise, the effect from firm size also appears to be 
consistent between the different measures of returns. However, the effect is only significantly 
negative in column 1. Overall, the (abnormal) returns decrease when the event window 
decreases, as expected. Naturally, this is explained by the fact that the returns are aggregated 
over a shorter time period. 
 
To summarize, we do not find any evidence that companies with tax haven presence obtain 
higher abnormal returns. Even though we find a slightly positive overall effect when we define 
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a tax haven according to the black list, the effect is not significant, and our hypothesis is 
consequently not supported. This may indicate that there are other factors than presence in tax 
havens that explain the difference in abnormal returns between embargo violators. The most 
noteworthy effect on abnormal returns seems to be the size and whether the company is 
headquartered in an OECD country or not. 
 
5.4 Limitations and further research 
In this subsection, we will acknowledge limitations of our analysis and make suggestions for 
further research. First of all, most of the selected embargoes are targeted at non-governmental 
forces. Although we have attempted to identify conflict events that do not involve governmental 
or UN/US forces, the change in arms demand might stem from these actors, i.e. legal sales. Our 
reasoning is that the government might be mobilizing to crack down on insurgents. However, 
one can argue that any sales to embargo-affected countries are considered controversial.  
 
Furthermore, we have only considered whether a company has an affiliate in any of the 
jurisdictions in accordance with the two definitions of tax havens. Hence, we have not 
considered potential differences regarding transparency and information exchange standards 
between tax havens. In addition, we have based the identification strategy of violators over 15 
years, while the tax haven analysis is based on presence in tax haven at a specific moment of 
time, i.e. the most recent company information. Thus, we have not considered any changes in 
tax haven presence over the time period.  
 
For further research, it would be interesting to identify a measure that enables the researcher to 
differentiate between jurisdictions that are known to be uncooperative versus the cooperative. 
The purpose would be to identify jurisdictions that are more commonly used by potential 
embargo violators, and thereby address tax havens that should be monitored more closely. In 
addition, one can use the methodology on a bigger sample size by including more embargoes, 
companies, events and years. A potential benefit of extending the sample is to gain more 
observations for our second hypothesis testing, which we acknowledge may be too small to find 
significant relationships in this thesis. Another benefit would be to detect companies that have 
chains of illegal reactions in more than one embargo, and thereby strengthen the suspicion of 
involvement in embargo violations. 




In this thesis, we have detected possible UN arms embargo violations by global arms companies 
and analyzed the violators’ connections to tax havens. Using the event study methodology, we 
assessed the stock price reactions of arms companies around the date of several conflict 
incidents within six embargoes. The presence of abnormal returns suggests that insiders and 
well-informed investors, who we assume are aware of the company’s involvement in embargo 
breaches, change their expectations of the company’s future earnings as a result of increased or 
decreased arms demand within the embargo. The event study approach enabled us to detect 19 
possible embargo violators, out of a sample consisting of 108 arms companies, in the time 
period 2005 to 2020. Furthermore, we have presented theory that explains how the structure of 
tax havens facilitate crimes, and thereby lower the cost of involvement in illegal arms trade. As 
a result, we aimed to test our main hypotheses: 1) arms companies with tax haven presence are 
more likely to violate arms embargoes and 2) arms embargo violators with presence in tax 
havens obtain higher abnormal returns. To draw an inference on the hypotheses, we conducted 
empirical analyzes of the findings from the event studies. 
 
Our findings are somewhat mixed as we have tested the hypotheses based on two different lists 
of tax havens, one including recurring jurisdictions in the OECD (2000), Tax Justice Network 
(2007) and IMF (2008) lists, and the other in accordance with only Tax Justice Network (2007) 
and IMF (2008). When defining tax haven based on the first list, our findings suggest that 
companies with tax havens are less likely to violate embargoes, but the result is non-significant. 
Contrarily, when using the latter list, we find that companies with tax haven presence are 
statistically significantly more likely to violate embargoes. Hence, our findings could indicate 
that embargo violators possibly use tax havens to hide the origin of proceeds stemming from 
illegal arms trade. Regarding the second hypothesis, we did not find any significant results that 
indicate that violators with presence in tax havens obtain higher abnormal returns around 
conflict dates. However, an interesting finding is that violators headquartered in OECD 
countries obtain statistically significantly lower returns compared to violators in non-OECD 
countries. We interpret these results as reflecting the higher cost of committing crimes when 
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A.1 List of arms and defense companies 
No. Company Country Obs. Source 
1 AECOM USA 3351 SIPRI 
2 Airbus SE Netherlands 4264 SIPRI 
3 Allen-Vanguard Corp Canada 1429 SIC 
4 Allied Defense Group Inc. (The) USA 1929 SIC 
5 Amphenol Corp USA 4191 SIPRI 
6 Anhui Jiangnan Chemical Industry Co Ltd China 2994 SIC 
7 Armor Holdings Inc USA 899 SIC 
8 Arotech Corp USA 4015 SIC 
9 Aryt Industries Ltd Israel 3567 SIC 
10 Asahi-Seiki Manufacturing Co Ltd Japan 3881 SIC 
11 Aselsan A.S. Turkey 4035 SIPRI 
12 Austal Limited Australia 4207 SIPRI 
13 B/E Aerospace Inc USA 3343 SIC 
14 Babcock International Group PLC Great Britain 4296 SIPRI 
15 BAE Systems PLC Great Britain 4296 SIPRI 
16 Ball Corp USA 4191 SIPRI 
17 Biafo Industries Ltd Pakistan 373 SIC 
18 Boeing Co USA 4194 SIPRI 
19 Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corp USA 2462 SIPRI 
20 BWX Technologies Inc USA 2553 SIC, SIPRI 
21 CACI International Inc USA 4194 SIPRI 
22 CAE Inc. Canada 4185 SIPRI 
23 Cobham PLC Great Britain 4136 SIPRI 
24 COM DEV International Ltd Canada 3040 SIC 
25 Conrad Industries Inc USA 4194 SIC 
26 Cubic Corp USA 4194 SIPRI 
27 Curtiss-Wright Corp USA 4193 SIPRI 
28 Dassault Aviation SA France 4258 SIPRI 
29 Delta Tucker Holdings Inc USA 1049 SIPRI 
30 Dyno Nobel Ltd Australia 540 SIC 
31 Elbit Systems Ltd Israel 3957 SIC, SIPRI 
32 Electromed Inc USA 2526 SIC 
33 Engineered Support Systems Inc USA 523 SIC 
34 EnPro Industries Inc. USA 4194 SIC 
35 Firstec Co Ltd South Korea 4084 SIC 
36 Fluor Corp USA 4192 SIPRI 
37 Fujitsu Ltd Japan 4076 SIPRI 
38 General Dynamics Corp USA 4193 SIC, SIPRI 
39 General Electric Co USA 4194 SIPRI 
40 GKN PLC Great Britain 3706 SIPRI 
41 Goodrich Corp USA 2157 SIC 
42 Gradlink (Israel) Ltd Israel 1079 SIC 
43 Hanwha Aerospace Co Ltd South Korea 4091 SIPRI 
44 Hi-Shear Technology Corp USA 1483 SIC 
45 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited India 592 SIPRI 
46 Honeywell International Inc USA 4194 SIC, SIPRI 
47 Hosoya Pyro-Engineering Co Japan 3583 SIC 
48 Huaibei Mining Holdings Co Ltd China 500 SIC 
49 Hunan Nanling Industry Explosive Material Co Ltd China 3303 SIC 
50 Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc USA 2377 SIC, SIPRI 
51 IHI Corp Japan 4076 SIPRI 
52 Incitec Pivot Ltd Australia 4199 SIC 
53 Jacobs Engineering Group Inc. USA 4193 SIPRI 
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54 Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd Japan 4076 SIPRI 
55 KBR Inc USA 3469 SIPRI 
56 Keltech Energies India 1993 SIC 
57 Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd South Korea 2246 SIPRI 
58 Kovrov Mechanical Plant JSC Russia 2661 SIC 
59 L3 Technologies Inc USA 3898 SIPRI 
60 Leidos Holdings Inc USA 3492 SIPRI 
61 Leonardo SPA Italy 4232 SIPRI 
62 LIG Nex1 Co Ltd South Korea 1198 SIPRI 
63 Lockheed Martin Corp USA 4194 SIC, SIPRI 
64 Manroy PLC Great Britain 192 SIC 
65 ManTech International Corp USA 4194 SIPRI 
66 Meggitt PLC Great Britain 4296 SIPRI 
67 Melrose Industries PLC Great Britain 4053 SIPRI 
68 Miroku Corp Japan 3862 SIC 
69 Mitsubishi Electric Corp Japan 4077 SIPRI 
70 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd Japan 4075 SIPRI 
71 Moog Inc. USA 4194 SIPRI 
72 Nec Corp Japan 4076 SIPRI 
73 Nevada Chemicals Inc USA 1210 SIC 
74 Noble Explochem Ltd India 4054 SIC 
75 Northrop Grumman Corp USA 4193 SIPRI 
76 Orbital ATK Inc USA 3630 SIC 
77 Orbital Sciences Corp USA 2794 SIC 
78 Orica Ltd Australia 4204 SIC 
79 Oshkosh Corp USA 4193 SIPRI 
80 Perspecta Inc USA 571 SIPRI 
81 Poly Union Chemical Holding Group Co Ltd China 3849 SIC 
82 Premier Explosives Ltd India 3467 SIC 
83 Qinetiq Group Great Britain 3763 SIPRI 
84 QLogic Corp USA 3176 SIC 
85 Raytheon Co. USA 4090 SIPRI 
86 Rheinmetall AG, Duesseldorf Germany 4227 SIPRI 
87 Rockwell Collins Inc USA 3751 SIPRI 
88 Rolls Royce Holdings PLC Great Britain 4296 SIPRI 
89 RSC Energia Russia 2742 SIC 
90 Saab AB Sweden 2949 SIPRI 
91 Safran SA France 4260 SIC, SIPRI 
92 Science Applications International Corp USA 1752 SIPRI 
93 Serco Group PLC Great Britain 4296 SIPRI 
94 Shanxi Tond Chemical Co Ltd China 2549 SIC 
95 Sichuan Yahua Industrial Group Co Ltd China 2383 SIC 
96 Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd Singapore 4179 SIPRI 
97 Ste D'Explosifs & De Produits Chimiques France 3698 SIC 
98 Sturm Ruger & Co Inc. USA 4194 SIC 
99 Teledyne Technologies Inc. USA 4194 SIPRI 
100 Textron Inc USA 4192 SIPRI 
101 Thales France 4261 SIC, SIPRI 
102 Thyssenkrupp AG, Duisburg/Essen Germany 4227 SIPRI 
103 TransDigm Group Inc USA 3641 SIPRI 
104 TRL Electronics PLC Great Britain 456 SIC 
105 United Defense Industries Inc. USA 372 SIC 
106 Vectrus Inc USA 1499 SIPRI 
107 Verney-Carron S.A France 2949 SIC 
108 ViaSat Inc. USA 4194 SIPRI 
Notes. Company is the name of the arms company included in the thesis. Country is the country 
where the company is headquartered. Obs. is the number of observations for the specific company 
in the sample. Source denotes whether we retrieved the company from the SIPRI list and/or based 
on SIC code. 
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A.2 List of market indices 
Notes. Country refers to the headquarter country of the company. Market index represents the respective 





















Country Market Index 
Australia S&P ASX 200 Index 
Canada S&P TSX 
China Shanghai SE Composite Index 
France CAC 40 
Germany Deutscher Aktienindex 
India S&P BSE Sensex 
Israel Tel Aviv 35 Index 
Italy FTSE Milano Italia Borsa Index 
Japan Nikkei 225 
Netherlands Amsterdam Exchange Index  
Pakistan FTSE Pakistan Index  
Russia Russian Trading System Index 
Singapore FTSE Straits Times Index 
South Korea Korea Composite Stock Price Index 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 Index 
Turkey Borsa Istanbul 100 Index 
Great Britain FTSE 100 Index 
USA S&P 500  
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A.3 List of events 
Central African Republic (embargo imposed 12/05/2013) 
Event ID Event date Type of event Hostility effect Source example 
1 12/05/2013 Clashes ↑ ACLED, NY Times, The Guardian 
2 01/31/2014 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
3 04/09/2014 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
4 05/28/2014 Church attack ↑ ACLED, BBC 
5 06/24/2014 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
6 09/28/2015 Prison attack ↑ ACLED, BBC, The Guardian 
7 11/24/2016 Clashes ↑ ACLED, The Guardian 
8 06/20/2017 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
9 05/01/2018 Church attack ↑ ACLED, BBC 
10 02/02/2019 Peace agreement ↓ ACLED, BBC, NY Times 
Libya (embargo imposed 02/26/2011) 
Event ID Event date Type of event Hostility effect Source example 
11 11/15/2013 Attacks on civilians ↑ ACLED, BBC 
12 
05/16/2014 
Second civil war 
breaks out 
↑ ACLED, BBC 
13 02/20/2015 Bombing ↑ ACLED, BBC 
14 12/17/2015 Peace agreement ↓ CNN, The Guardian 
15 05/19/2017 Airbase attack ↑ ACLED, BBC 
16 05/27/2017 Clashes ↑ ACLED, CNN 
17 
09/03/2018 
Clashes and prison 
break 
↑ ACLED, BBC 
18 04/04/2019 Declaration of war ↑ ACLED, CNN 
19 07/03/2019 Airstrike ↑ ACLED, Daily Mail 
20 01/05/2020 Airstrike ↑ ACLED, The Guardian 
Yemen (embargo imposed 04/14/2015) 
Event ID Event date Type of event Hostility effect Source example 
21 06/30/2015 Prison break ↑ ACLED, BBC 
22 09/04/2015 Clashes ↑ NY Times 
23 12/06/2015 Governor killed ↑ ACLED. BBC 
24 08/29/2016 Bombing ↑ ACLED, BBC 





↑ ACLED, BBC, NY Times 
27 04/23/2018 Political leader killed ↑ ACLED, BBC, CNN 






30 01/18/2020 Missile attack ↑ ACLED, BBC, CNN 
 




Democratic Republic of Congo (embargo imposed 07/28/2003) 
Event ID Event date Type of event Hostility effect Source example 
31 02/02/2007 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
32 01/23/2008 Peace agreement ↓ BBC 
33 12/29/2008 Church attack ↑ ACLED, Fox News, BBC 
34 01/23/2009 Rebel leader arrested ↓ BBC 
35 02/27/2011 Attempted coup ↑ ACLED, BBC 
36 07/06/2012 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
37 11/20/2012 Rebels gain territory ↑ ACLED, BBC, CNN 
38 03/18/2013 Rebel leader arrested ↓ BBC, CNN 
39 11/05/2013 Peace agreement ↓ ACLED, CNN, Washington Post 
40 09/20/2016 Clashes ↑ ACLED, The Guardian 
Somalia (embargo imposed 01/23/1992) 
Event ID Event date Type of event Hostility effect Source example 
41 
02/24/2005 
End of government 
exile 
↓ BBC, The Guardian 
42 06/09/2008 Peace agreement ↓ BBC 
43 06/18/2009 Minister killed ↑ ACLED, CNN, NY Times 
44 
02/09/2012 
Rebels merge with 
terror organization 
↑ BBC, CNN 
45 06/09/2016 Bombing ↑ ACLED, BBC, The Guardian 
46 08/21/2016 Bombings ↑ ACLED, CNN 
47 10/14/2017 Bombings ↑ ACLED, NY Times, The Guardian 
48 07/23/2018 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 






Sudan, Darfur region (embargo imposed 07/30/2004) 
Event ID Event date Type of event Hostility effect Source example 
51 05/05/2006 Peace agreement ↓ BBC 
52 05/10/2008 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC, The Guardian 
53 05/24/2009 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
54 02/23/2010 Peace agreement ↓ BBC, CNN 
55 
12/25/2011 
Founder of rebel 
group killed 
↑ ACLED, BBC, Washington Post 
56 09/08/2012 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
57 08/21/2014 Clashes ↑ ACLED, BBC 
58 04/11/2019 Coup ↓ ACLED, BBC, CNN 
59 08/17/2019 Peace agreement ↓ Daily Mail 
60 07/27/2020 Clashes ↑ BBC 
Notes. The event ID is the unique ID for each event. The event date is the date of the incident. Hostility effect 
refers to the impact on conflict in the embargo, whereby upward arrow denotes conflict increase and downward 
arrow denotes conflict decrease. Source example is examples of sources that have covered the event. All news 
sources (except ACLED) are on the SimilarWeb’s ranking of top websites measured by web traffic. 
